Indeterminacy and Craft in Judicial Review of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro and Levy by Breger, Marshall J.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 1 Fall 1995 Article 5 
1995 
Indeterminacy and Craft in Judicial Review of Administrative Law: 
A Comment on Shapiro and Levy 
Marshall J. Breger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Marshall J. Breger, Indeterminacy and Craft in Judicial Review of Administrative Law: A Comment on 
Shapiro and Levy, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 109 (1996). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
INDETERMINACY AND CRAFT IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A
COMMENT ON SHAPIRO
AND LEVY
Marshall J. Breger*
In a fascinating article published in the Duke Law Journal, Sidney Sha-
piro and Richard Levy argue in favor of more determinacy in the judicial
review of administrative law cases.' They explore the reasons for indeter-
minacy and make some interesting suggestions to meet their goal of in-
creased determinacy.2 Specifically, Shapiro and Levy propose amending
the Administrative Procedure Act3 (APA) to include "specific inquiries"
in place of "open-ended scope of review standards."' One of the inces-
sant complaints of students taking Administrative Law (or practitioners
practicing it) is that there often appears to be applicable black letter doc-
trine, and yet decisions appear to vary greatly.
Put simply, Shapiro and Levy are unhappy that they cannot handicap
judges in administrative law cases. I understand their concern, as I have
problems picking winners at Saratoga. There is, of course, a science to
success at the track (or so readers of the racing form believe). Is there a
similar method of prediction at the courthouse?
* Visiting Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. The
author was Solicitor of Labor during the Bush Administration. I want to thank the Heri-
tage Foundation in Washington, D.C. where I served as Senior Fellow during the prepara-
tion of this Essay.
1. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995).
2. Id. at 1073-74.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
4. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1074. For example, Shapiro and Levy argue that
the" 'arbitrary [and] capricious' "and" 'substantial evidence' "tests are imprecise in prac-
tice. Id. at 1065.
5. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 982 (1992) (arguing that the Court often fails to apply Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), even in cases implicating deference
issues); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empiri-
cal Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1030-40 (describing the tem-
porary effect of Chevron on appellate court affirmance rates of agency review).
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Shapiro and Levy believe there should be such a method: the use by
judges of craft norms which they define as "the well-reasoned application
of doctrine to the circumstances of a particular case." 6 Craft means con-
sistency.7 Shapiro and Levy claim that their approach is "outcome-neu-
tral in the sense that the judge does not consider the implications of a
given result for the parties or society in general."8 Yet, as we will see,
Shapiro and Levy want to stack the deck.
After providing us with a psychology of judicial behavior,' in which
they describe judges as instinctively selecting outcome norms which allow
the judge to "focus[ ] on the result in a given case and its implications for
the parties and society as a whole"'" (it is less work and better for the
soul; after all, they get to choose the outcome they like!), Shapiro and
Levy argue that "the average judge becomes less outcome oriented as
craft becomes more determinate . . . ."' Social choice theory provides
the basis for this hypothesis, one which classifies the judiciary as a utility-
maximizing group.12
Assuming that there is often conflict between the decision a judge
would like to reach and that which he is bound to reach, Shapiro and
Levy further argue that the judiciary solves this tension between duty and
desire by staking out, as its craft norm, doctrinal indeterminacy. This
[brilliant] innovation "permits judges to pursue outcome without sacrific-
ing craft-thus maximizing utility from respect, ideology, and leisure-it
is not surprising that much of judicial doctrine is indeterminate."" In
essence, Shapiro and Levy argue that judges want easily manipulated
rules, allowing them to reach desired results, while still claiming adher-
6. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1053.
7. Id. Craft means consistency between "constitutional and statutory provisions and
continuity with prior case law." Id. (citing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 222 (1993)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1056-58. "[Jludging affect[s] the extent to which judges obtain respect, ideo-
logical rewards, and leisure." Id. at 1056.
10. Id. at 1053. Shapiro and Levy further suggest that outcome norms reflect "the
values of justice and social utility as filtered through a judge's worldview." Id.
11. Id. at 1059.
12. Id. at 1061-62. For an excellent discussion of the application of public choice the-
ory to the law, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). Shapiro and Levy examine the sources of judicial util-
ity, focusing on the respect of peers, the ability to render decisions in accord with the
individual judge's ideological preferences, and to a lesser extent, the impact on a judge's
leisure time. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1055-56.
13. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1061-62.
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ence to settled doctrine.' 4 This is especially the case, the authors argue,
with administrative law.1 5
The second section of Shapiro and Levy's article explains how current
doctrines of judicial review support doctrinal indeterminacy. In their
view, indeterminacy is "achieved primarily through two mechanisms: the
use of open-ended 'standards' of deference and the proliferation of ma-
nipulable categories to which different degrees of deference. apply."' 6
The exemplars of such manipulable categories, Shapiro and Levy suggest,
are the present standards of review used in the APA, specifically "'sub-
stantial evidence' " in the record17 and " 'arbitrary [and] capricious.' "18
In viewing these standards as open-ended and subjective, Shapiro and
Levy take the same view, albeit in more academic language, as do my
administrative law students at the Columbus School of Law of the Catho-
lic University of America. I, of course, try to tell them otherwise; that
order exists in administrative law; and that the critical legal thinkers and
other deconstructionists are wrong to conclude that a judge's reasoning
ability is less important than his personal or professional biases. But now
my students have the scholarship of Shapiro and Levy to draw upon.
This Essay begins by examining whether more precise codification of
statutory scope of review language will actually bring about a greater de-
gree of determinacy in judicial decisions, and explains the reasons why
indeterminacy currently exists. The proposed Shapiro and Levy standard
is discussed next, as is their reliance on public choice theory to explain
judicial behavior. Finally, this Essay concludes that while Shapiro and
Levy raise interesting points, their quest for judicial determinacy is
misguided.
I. DOESMORE PRECISE CODIFICATION OF SCOPE OF REVIEW
LANGUAGE ACHIEVE DETERMINACY?
Shapiro and Levy are not just describers of how things are- they are
legal reformers as well. In part III of their article they seek to cajole
presumably indeterminacy-loving judges into becoming more determi-
nate through the use of statutory language.' 9 Yes, they want to replace
14. Id. at 1062.
15. The authors suggest that administrative law is particularly susceptible to indeter-
minate craft norms because "[f]irst, the utility of being outcome-oriented is greater than in
private law areas. Second, the disutility of having indeterminate craft norms is not as great
as in other legal areas." Id.
16. Id. at 1064.
17. Id. at 1065 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988)).
18. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988) (alteration in original)).
19. Id. at 1072.
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the talismanic phrases "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capri-
cious" with a much more lengthy revised APA § 70620 which codifies both
the State Farm21 and Chevron.22 Yet, the question we need to ask is
whether or not more detailed explication of the § 706 standard will en-
able judges to arrive at better decisions. Consider the various approaches
to regulatory reform offered by the new Republican Congress. These in-
clude The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 199523 (part of
the Contract with America), its Senate analogous: the Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform Act of 199524 (S. 343) (six versions!) and the Regula-
tory Reform Act of 199525 (S. 291), as well as the Walker Amendment to
the Debt Limit Extension Act.26
The early versions of S. 343 attempted to establish a standard of review
comprised of "specific inquiries" for the court. It is instructive to com-
pare the initial draft of the judicial review provision with the later ver-
sion, which evolved from committee markup.27 The differences in the
20. Id. at 1073-75 (proposing an amended § 706).
21. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983). The Court rejected Petitioner's contention that the appropriate stan-
dard under which to review an agency's rescission of a regulation should be the same as the
standard applied had the agency refused to promulgate the rule in the first place. Id. at 41-
42. The Court rejected this contention and held that the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard applies, requiring an agency rescinding a rule to supply a reasoned analysis. Id. at 41-
43.
22. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). The Chevron decision outlined a two-step analysis to be used when reviewing an
agency's interpretation of a statute. Id. at 842. First, the court inquires whether Congress
specifically has addressed the precise issue, then the agency must abide by this congres-
sional determination. Id. at 842-43. If, on the other hand, Congress has not spoken to the
precise question at issue, then the court determines whether the agency's interpretation of
the statute is reasonable. Id. at 843. This is the second step of the analysis. Id. If the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, then the court must uphold the agency's interpreta-
tion. Id.
23. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 1995). H.R. 1022, the Risk Assessment and
Communications Act, was passed by the overwhelming vote of 286 to 141 on February 28,
1995-just five days after being referred to committee. It was then repassed as part of the
larger reform bill, H.R. 9, by a vote of 277 to 141 on March 3, 1995.
24. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 624 (as introduced Feb. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Ver-
sion 1]; id. (as amended Feb. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Version 2]; id. (as reported from Senate
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, May 26, 1995) [hereinafter Version 3]; id. (as reported from Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, May 26, 1995) [hereinafter Version 4]; id. (as amended (floor
vehicle before debate) June 28, 1995) [hereinafter Version 5]; id. (as amended (at 3d clo-
ture vote) July 21, 1995) [hereinafter Version 6] (this version of the legislation is commonly
referred to as "Dole-Grassley").
25. S. 291, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 623 (Jan. 27, 1995). The Democrat alternative to S.
291, S. 1001 was deliberately similar to the Republican bill.
26. H.R. 2586, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 7, 1995) (amendment offered by Rep.
Walker (R. Pa.) 141 Cong. Rec. H. 12064).
27. Version 4, supra note 24, § 706 (May 26, 1995).
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earlier28 and later29 versions are clear. Version I of S. 343 jettisons both
28. Version 1, supra note 24, § 628 ("Standard for review of agency interpretations of
an enabling statute"). Specifically, § 628 states:
(a) In reviewing a final agency action under section 706 of this title, or under a
statute that provides for review of a final agency action, the reviewing court shall
affirm the agency's interpretation of the statute granting authority to promulgate
the rule if, applying traditional principles of statutory construction, the reviewing
court finds that the interpretation is clearly the interpretation of the statute in-
tended by Congress.
(b) If the reviewing court, applying traditional principles of statutory construc-
tion, finds that an interpretation other than the interpretation applied by the
agency is clearly the interpretation of the statute intended by Congress, the re-
viewing court shall find that the agency's interpretation is erroneous and contrary
to law.
(c) (1) If the reviewing court, applying established principles of statutory con-
struction, finds that the statute gives the agency discretion to choose from among
a range of permissible statutory constructions, the reviewing court shall affirm the
agency's interpretation where the record on review establishes that-
(A) the agency has correctly identified the range of permissible statutory
constructions;
(B) the interpretation chosen is one that is within that range; and
(C) the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking in determining that
the interpretation, rather than other permissible constructions of the statute, is
the one that maximizes net benefits to society.
(2) If an agency's interpretation of a statute cannot be affirmed under para-
graph (1), the reviewing court shall find that the agency's interpretation is arbi-
trary and capricious.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 623 ("Decisional criteria") of Version 1 outlines the deci-
sional criteria an agency must use when issuing a final rule. They are as follows:
(a) No final rule subject to this subchapter shall be promulgated unless the agency
finds that-
(1) the potential benefits to society from the rule outweigh the potential costs
of the rule to society, as determined by the analysis required by section
622(d)(2)(B); and
(2) the rule will provide greater net benefits to society than any of the reason-
able alternatives identified pursuant to section 622(c)(2)(C), including the mar-
ket-based mechanisms identified pursuant to section 622(c)(2)(D).
(b) The requirements of this section shall supplement the decisional criteria for
rulemaking otherwise applicable under the statute granting the rulemaking au-
thority, except when such statute contains explicit textual language prohibiting
the consideration of the criteria set forth in this section. Where the agency finds
that consideration of the criteria set forth in this section is prohibited by explicit
statutory language, the agency shall transmit its finding to Congress, along with
the final cost-benefit analysis required by section 622(d)(2)(B).
Id
29. Version 4, supra note 24, § 706(c) ("Scope of review"). In comparison to Version
1, Version 4 provides:
In reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute governing the authority for an
agency action, including agency action taken pursuant to a statute that provides
for review of final agency action, the reviewing court shall-
(1) hold erroneous and unlawful-
1995]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:109
the APA "arbitrary and capricious, 3' and the "substantial evidence" tests
for judicial review of agency action.31 While it appears to codify the fa-
mous Chevron two-step analysis in its instruction to the courts,32 its step
two is clearly less deferential to agency judgments. Instead, Version 1
requires a reviewing court to determine that the agency used "reasoned
decisionmaking in determining that the [agency's] interpretation.., is the
one that maximizes net benefits to society."33 As marked up by the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Version 4 in contrast, gives up on codifying Chev-
ron and demands only that an agency explain "in a reasoned analysis why
it selected the interpretation [it did] and why it rejected other permissible
interpretations of the statute. 34
It is unclear whether all this added specificity is in aid of 'craft,' but I
doubt that these efforts at codification will actually enhance the determi-
nacy of judicial opinions. Indeed, it is far more likely that the parsing of
this quest for precision by litigants and judges will yield even more uncer-
tainty than our present § 706. This quest for determinacy exemplifies
Wittgenstein's teaching that limits exist to the understanding of the world
that we can articulate through language. 35 Indeed, the various staffers
(and lobbyists?) drafting the different iterations of S. 343 recognized this.
They dropped the effort to codify Chevron and give specific instructions
to the courts leaving (with some change) the traditional 706 judicial re-
(A) an agency interpretation that is other than the interpretation of the statute
clearly intended by Congress; or
(B) an agency interpretation that is outside the range of permissible interpreta-
tions of the statute; and
(2) hold arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion-
(A) an agency action as to which the agency-
(i) has improperly classified an interpretation as being within or outside the
rAnge of permissible interpretations; or
(ii) has not explained in a reasoned analysis why it selected the interpretation
and why it rejected other permissible interpretations of the statute; or
(B) in the case of agency action subject to chapter 6, an interpretation that does
not give the agency the broadest discretion to develop rules that will satisfy the
decisional criteria of section 624.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provisions of this subsection
shall apply to, and supplement, the requirements contained in any statute for the
review of final agency action which is not otherwise subject to this subsection.
Id. § 706 (c)-(d).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
31. Id. § 706(2)(E).
32. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
33. Version 1, supra note 24, § 628(c)(1)(C).
34. Version 4, supra note 24, § 706(c)(2)(A)(ii).
35. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans. 3d ed. 1958). These concepts are well discussed in Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disa-
greement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997 (1994).
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view standards.36 Other versions of regulatory reform, like the so called
Walker Amendment, also reverted in the main to traditional APA stan-
dards of review recognizing that you cannot micromanage judicial review
through statutory specificity.37
In any event, I do not understand what a more determinate standard of
review means. Do Shapiro and Levy believe that any five judges ap-
proaching the same problem will come out with the same "determinate"
result? This desire drove Judge Marvin Frankel and others to seek some
form of required guidelines to establish consistency among sentencing
judges.3 8 The result, the United States Sentencing Commission and the
Sentencing Guidelines, suggest the outer limits of determinacy 39 - some
call it a procrustean bed of consistency.4" This consistency has caused
grave concern for members of the judiciary, who feel they are no longer
allowed to consider the interests of justice in individual cases." In an
extreme example, these concerns led Federal District Judge J. Lawrence
Irving to resign, claiming that " 'I just can't in good conscience, continue
to do this.' "42 Perhaps instead, Shapiro and Levy mean that each judge
will apply the same method of decision-making, even though each may
end up with a different result? I think that Shapiro and Levy have the
36. Version 6, supra note 24, § 706(a)(2)(F) (adding to the existing list of conditions of
review those agency actions "without substantial support in the rulemaking file, viewed as
a whole, for the asserted or necessary factual basis, in the case of a rule adopted in a
proceeding subject to section 553").
37. See H.R. 2586, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 7, 1995) (amendment offered by Rep.
Walker (R. Pa.) 141 CONG. REC. H 12064) (Walker Amendment) (section 706(a)(2)(A)
(1994) would permit the reviewing court to set aside arbitrary or capricious decisions or
abuses of discretion).
38. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972) (ad-
vocating that defects in United States sentencing need to be addressed). For a positive
appraisal, see Michael Tonry, The Success of Judge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 713 (1993). But see Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for
Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2047, 2050-51 (1992) (defending the need for
guidelines, while recognizing the need for improvement). Frankel discusses "the pattern of
excessive severity" in the guidelines as currently applied. Id. at 2046-47.
39. See Michael Tonry, The Failure of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, 39
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 131, 133 (1993). The Sentencing Reform Act established the
United States Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988) (describing the estab-
lishment, purpose, and procedures of the United States Sentencing Commission).
40. For a detailed analysis of the Sentencing Commission's efforts, see Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) (tracing both the history of the Guidelines' develop-
ment and their application by various actors in sentencing proceedings, as well as highlight-
ing shortcomings in both the structure and methods of the Commission).
41. See Address by the Honorable Stanley Sporkin at the American University Law
Review Annual Dinner, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991) (discussing judicial opposition to
"Guideline Sentencing").
42. Id. at 3 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, § 1, at 22).
1995]
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former in mind and I am not certain I agree. Determinacy in the sense of
outcome predictiveness is not the consistency which, I should think, is
the mark of good judging. Consistency does not mean that you can pre-
dict the result, it means that like situations should be treated alike. This
means that you have to read the judge's opinion to see how he distin-
guishes cases in order to decide whether he achieves consistency. Consis-
tency then, may have nothing to do with outcome predictiveness.
A review of the Contract With America and its kindred legislative pro-
posals must make one skeptical about Congress' interest in seeking neu-
tral principles in choosing a standard of review. True, the APA was
passed unanimously, but it was approved after ten years of debate, with
an extraordinary amount of empirical research and over 40 separate gov-
ernment studies and analyses. The process included a veto of one early
effort, the Walter-Logan bill,43 and a five year respite for World War II,
allowing much of the passion to cool before the legislation was finally
passed in 1945. 4 We cannot infer from the APA experience that Con-
gress is much interested in Shapiro and Levy's noble yet apolitical desire
to increase determinacy in judicial opinions.
If anything, the present congressional disposition is apparently to sup-
port language that would do the very opposite. Congress seems to dis-
trust agency discretion and supports efforts to control it. Thus, S. 343
includes statutory language that limits agency discretion in rulemaking by
requiring a cost-benefit justification of rules,45 demanding far more preci-
sion in the notice of proposed rulemaking46 (thus constraining the agency
from roaming beyond the notice during the comment period), reviving
the legislative veto in constitutional form through a 'report and wait' pro-
43. H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (expanding judicial review of administra-
tive agency decisions) (vetoed by President Franklin Roosevelt, 86 CONG. REc. 13,942-43
(1940)); see also Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 271-74 (1978) (discussing the history of the Walter-Logan bill).
44. For a history of the APA, see Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act:
The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219 (1986) (describing the actions that led to the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act and the death of the proposals that preceded the APA); see
Verkuil, supra note 43, at 261-76 (providing a historical analysis of administrative proce-
dure before the 1946 APA).
45. Version 1, supra note 24, § 622(c)(1)(A) ("When the agency publishes a notice of
proposed rulemaking for a major rule, the agency shall issue and place in the rulemaking
record a draft cost-benefit analysis, and shall include a summary of such analysis in the
notice of proposed rulemaking.").
46. Id. § 622(a)(1) ("Prior to publishing notice of proposed rulemaking for any rule
... each agency shall determine whether the rule is or is not a major rule .... ); see also id.
§ 622 (a)(2) ("Each notice of proposed rulemaking shall include a succinct statement and
explanation of the agency's determination under paragraph (1)."); id. § 622(b)(2) ("Such
determination or designation shall be published in the Federal Register, together with a
succinct statement of the basis for the determination or designation.").
[Vol. 45:109
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vision,47 requiring agencies to review their existing regulations over a ten
year cycle,4 8 and providing for a look-back provision by which interested
parties can petition agencies to reopen existing rules (including in some
instances interpretative rules) 9 by requiring agencies to undertake cost-
benefit analyses where appropriate. 50 Further, the latest versions of the
reform legislation offers numerous opportunities for judicial review,5' so
much so that the Washington Post incisively observed that "[t]he bill is set
up to be enforced through litigation." 2 Given these efforts to structure
agency discretion, it is not surprising that the bill is not amenable to no-
tions of deference.
Shapiro and Levy must realize that Congress today wants more review
of administrative agency action and less deference to supposed agency
expertise. The Republican Congress wants to give itself a chance to re-
view agency activity through either "report and wait" or "corrections
day" mechanisms. Alternatively Congress proposes employing courts to
look over agencies' "shoulders" (if not review de novo as with the Bump-
ers Amendment).53 They certainly do not want to turn to Tom Mc-
Garity's formula for courts to grade rules on a pass-fail basis, much as a
47. Id. § 626(b)(1) ("Before a major rule takes effect as a final rule, the agency
promulgating such rule shall submit to the Congress a copy of such rule and a report con-
taining a concise general statement relating to the rule, including a complete copy of the
cost-benefit analysis, and the proposed effective date of the rule."); id. § 626 (b)(2) (requir-
ing the agency to wait 45 days after Congress receives the report, or after the rule is pub-
lished in the Federal Register, before the rules takes effect, unless it is vetoed by
Congress).
48. See Version 4, supra note 24, § 627(b)(2) (petition for cost-benefit analysis) (not-
ing that "the review of a rule required by this section shall be completed not later than 10
years after the date of enactment of this section or 10 years after the date on which the rule
is promulgated, amended, or renewed, whichever is earlier").
49. See Version 1, supra note 24, § 625(a) (allowing parties subject to a major rule to
petition for a cost-benefit analysis). If the analysis indicates a reasonable likelihood that
the costs of the regulation exceed its benefits, the agency must review the regulation. Id.
While the APA allows parties to petition agencies to review existing rules, it merely pro-
vides that the "agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994).
50. See Version 1, supra note 24, § 625(a)(1) (stating "[a]ny person subject to a major
rule may petition the relevant agency or the President to perform a cost-benefit analysis
under this subchapter for the major rule .... ").
51. Version 5, supra note 24, § 625(e) ("Interlocutory Review") (allowing review of
whether a rule is a "major rule" or whether the risk assessment was performed correctly);
Version 6, supra note 24, § 625(e) ("Interlocutory Review") (adding review of whether the
rule will significantly impact small business pursuant to 605(b)).
52. Regulating Regulation, WASH. POST, July 6, 1995, at A20.
53. See 141 CONG. REC. S10,133 (July 17, 1995) (discussing the Bumpers Amend-
ment's application of the substantial evidence test to informal rulemaking; substantial evi-
dence is the standard used when examining whether the factual bases of the rule justifies
the ruling).
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professor would "determine whether a research paper on a topic with
which he is vaguely familiar meets the minimum standards for passable
work."'5 4 Nor are they likely to be responsive to Shapiro and Levy's new
version of § 706.
II. WHY WE HAVE INDETERMINACY
There are at least two reasons for indeterminacy in administrative law
jurisprudence.
A. Mixed Perceptions of the Administrative Process
The first reason is not so much the amount of pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations, but rather the fact that we as a nation remain am-
bivalent about the administrative process. Judicial indeterminacy is at-
tributable to our lack of social (or even elite) consensus on the role and
function of administrative agencies. In the days of Woodrow Wilson ad-
ministrative agencies were "experts" who understood ephemeral and
changing social science realities. 5 During the New Deal, the putative
expertise of administrative agencies undergirded the massive government
activism deemed necessary to spur economic recovery56 - and was
damned by conservatives as reflecting the first step toward abrogating
our traditional notions of due process and the rule of law.57 Witness the
views of Roscoe Pound excoriating the use of administrative tribunals to
decide matters, as a "Marxist" idea.5 s English views of administrative law
54. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1453 (1992) (discussing the metaphors used to describe judicial review
of administrative agencies).
55. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, reprinted in 56 POL. SCI. Q. 481,
501 (1941) (explaining the relationship between public opinion and administration); see
also Marshall J. Breger, Thoughts on Accountability and the Administrative Process, 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 399, 399-402 (1987) (discussing Woodrow Wilson's views on the separa-
tion of politics from administration).
56. See Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms
and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299, 306, 1983 (discussing regulatory mechanisms of
the new deal era and the deference given to agency administrators); Robert L. Rabin,
Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept of Rights 92 YALE L.J. 1174, 1178-80 (1983) (dis-
cussing the new idea era and the rise of administrative expertise). See generally JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (explaining the rise of faith in administra-
tive expertise during the New Deal era).
57. At least the modern version of anti-bureaucratic fever does not view the govern-
ment worker as potentially treasonous. Samuel Kaufman, Is the Administrative Process a
Fifth Column?, 6 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1940) (arguing that there must be more
judicial review of administrative agency decisions).
58. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331,
339-46 (1938) (stressing that the idea of "administrative absolutism" is repugnant to the
idea of traditional law in the United States).
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display a similar contempt for bureaucracy, castigating the rise of the ad-
ministrative state as "The New Despotism.
59
For many years administrative agencies were thought to be captured by
the iron triangle,6" if not by industry itself.61 In the 1970s they were
thought to provide points of entry for Nader folk pursuing public interest
law.62 Today the agencies have been deconstructed by many as nodes of
self-aggrandizement by public choice theorists.
63
In fact, not only is there no consensus about the administrative process,
but the views we have are often schizophrenic. Consider Philip Howard's
recent best seller, The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating
America, recently featured on the cover of U.S. News and World Re-
port.' 4 Howard cites numerous examples of foolishness by government
bureaucrats. 65 He points to the example of Mother Teresa, whose mis-
sionaries of charity set aside $500,000 to renovate an abandoned building
for the homeless in the Bronx.66 The nuns did not believe that modem
conveniences such as a dishwasher, washing machine, or elevator were
necessary. They felt they could do without the dishwasher and elevator,
but the project ran aground on the city's demand that they spend
$100,000 for an elevator they would never use.67 After two years Mother
59. LORD HEWART OF BURY, THE NEW DESPOTISM 37 (2d ed. 1945). The author
asserts that administrative law is "substantially the opposite of" the "rule of law." Id. The
author also states that "happily there is no English name for [administrative law]." Id.
60. See, e.g., GORDON ADAMS, THE IRON TRIANGLE: THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CON-
TRACTING 24-26 (Nancy Sokoloff ed., 1981); Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and the
Public Interest in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1991) (" 'Iron triangles' develop
between a regulatory agency, the legislative committee that oversees it, and the special
interest group representing the industry that the agency is required to regulate.").
61. For one example of this sentiment, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES iX (1981) (arguing that agencies allow their decisions to
be influenced by the industries they regulate).
62. See, e.g., ROBERT C. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970) (examining the Interstate Commerce Commission
and its relationship to the general public interest). Fellmeth notes that the ICC's purpose
is to serve as the aggressive and independent representative of the general public interest.
Id. at xiv; Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam
the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 874 (1973) (arguing that non-regulation of adminis-
trative agencies optimizes consumer welfare).
63. See generally, FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 5-6 (advocating that public
policy needs to be studied pragmatically and particularly, not merely in grand 'theory
terms).
64. Stephen Budiensky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, Jan. 30, 1995, at 50 (discussing how lawyers abuse the law and the concerns that
must be addressed).
65. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA 3-8 (1994).
66. Id. at 3-4.
67. Id. at 4.
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Teresa finally gave up and wrote the city, " '[t]he Sisters felt they could
use the money much more usefully for soup and sandwiches,'" noting
that the episode "'served to educate us about the law and its many
complexities.' "68
Howard writes further of the Amoco refinery in Yorktown, Virginia
that spent $31 million to put scrubbers in its smokestacks to remove ben-
zine pursuant to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation.69
The EPA missed the boat: the fumes were not being lost at the smoke-
stack but at the loading docks, where cleaning costs would be infinitesi-
mal.7" Cleaning the loading dock, however, is not required by EPA
rules.71
So far, Howard's complaint could be written by Newt Gingrich. But
Howard has a very different solution. While a severe critic of the bureau-
cratic process, he does not propose fewer rules or no rules; nor does he
propose more detailed rules and more aggressive judicial review. In-
stead, his project would empower bureaucrats by giving them more re-
sponsibility (or in administrative law terms, more discretion) to take
matters into their own hands. He wants to give bureaucrats flexibility to
waive or not to waive rules, to accept individuated compliance solutions
and ignore the letter of the law to accomplish its "spirit."
Tracking Howard, the state of Florida has proposed repealing half of its
28,750 rules by the end of the 1996 legislative session, substituting guide-
lines that will devolve greater discretion to agency officials.72 These ef-
forts have achieved only limited success, with the Governor having
vetoed a bill to reform the rule-making process, while continuing the
search for superfluous rules.73 The Canadian Parliament is also consider-
ing legislation to allow persons subject to regulations to propose alterna-
tive compliance plans that will "meet[ ] the regulatory goals of the
designated regulation. '74 Our own Congress currently is drafting legisla-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 7-8.
72. William Booth, Florida Seeks End to Rule By the Book, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
1995, at Al (reporting Florida's proposal to rule by common sense rather than by the
book); see also Ken Foskett, Miller Gives State Officials Dose of 'Common Sense', THE
ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 13, 1995, at 7B (discussing the genesis of a similar initiative in
Georgia by Governor Zell Miller).
73. See Craig Quintana, Chiles Scuttles Regulatory-Reform Bill, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 13, 1995, at C1 (reporting the governor's claim that his agencies have identified nearly
6,000 rules for repeal).
74. Bill C-62, An Act to Provide for the Achievement of Regulatory Goals Through
Alternatives to Designated Regulations and Through Administrative Agreements, 1st Sess.,
35th Parl., 1994 (1ST READING, DEC. 6, 1994).
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tion on "Alternate Compliance Strategies" that would allow agencies to
waive regulations for private parties who offer more efficient solutions to
problems.75
All this may be terrific for those who believe bureaucrats to be kadis-
in-waiting, prepared to do equity, in Justice Frankfurter's immortal im-
age, sitting "under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of
individual expediency."76 For those who share Justice Frankfurter's opti-
mism, there is no need to fear this regulatory approach. Indeed, even
Vice President Al Gore has adopted this perspective, pointing out that
"[e]ffective entrepreneurial governments ... empower those who work
on the front lines to make more of their own decisions and solve more of
their own problems."77
But if, like many red-blooded advocates of the Contract with America,
you believe that " '[r]egulatory agencies have run amuck and need to be
reformed,' "78 then you will focus more on "fairness" and consistency val-
ues in administrative law and demand a rigorous "cost-benefit" analysis
before you allow an agency to issue regulations-all because you want to
rein in those bureaucratic critters. As far back as the Brownlee Commis-
sion in the 1930s, critics have sought to restrict the flexibility and discre-
tion of administrative agencies by procedural constraints.79 As Philip K.
Howard incisively points out, "[o]ne of the worst elements of the Repub-
licans' plan for regulatory reform is that they want to make it even harder
to pass a new rule"8 (in part because the harder it is to pass a new rule
the harder it is to get rid of an old one).81 Indeed many would prefer
75. See House, Senate Considering Legislation for Alternative Compliance Strategies,
BNA Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 3, 1996, at 42 (discussing House and Senate initia-
tives that would permit the EPA and other agencies to waive regulations if party met the
intent of the regulation and offered a better solution than provided by law).
76. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
77. AL GORE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE
TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS 7 (1993)
(explaining how the reinvention and streamlining of government will help empower em-
ployees to become more productive and efficient).
78. Edmund L. Andrews, A Rising Deregulation Wave: Republicans Advance Pro-
Business Agenda, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan.3, 1996, at 12; see also Rep. Tom DeLay, De-
Lay Seeks His "Holy Grail": Regulatory Reform, ROLL CALL, Dec. 4, 1995, at 15.
79. See generally Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law,
1985 DUKE L.J. 427, 438-39 (critiquing the over-proceduralization of the administrative
process and urging a more focused view on substantive problems).
80. Regulatory Reform: The Case for Common Sense, An Interview with Philip K.
Howard, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1995, at 23, 26 (quoting Mr. Howard during an inter-
view concerning his book, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE).
81. Id.; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983) (requiring an agency revoking an established rule to
"supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance").
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"clogging the wheels of the federal bureaucracy,, 82 taking ironic pride in
"add[ing] more red tape and judicial oversight,"83 if not admitting that
such action is a " 'recipe for paralysis.' "84 For, as Congressman David
McIntosh suggests, "many Americans think paralyzing the federal gov-
ernment would be a good thing." 85
The government agencies actually "zeroed" out by the new Republican
Congress include both The Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment86 and the free-standing Administrative Conference of the United
States.87 Both of these agencies reflect the notion that there is a science
of administration and that administrative expertise can be brought to
bear to make the regulatory process more rational and more efficient
(and by so doing-more fair).
A similar disdain for regulatory process can be seen in the general view
of conservatives toward the ongoing budget battle with its intermittent
shutdowns of the federal government. As Donald Devine, head of the
Office of Personnel Management in the Reagan administration, pointed
out, " 'It's regulation on the cheap, keeping the government shut
down.' "88
We have today a large divergence in opinion as to the what weight to
give bureaucratic judgments. For many the deference to agency expertise
that characterized the New Deal regulatory paradigm is no more. In-
deed, the opposite is the case. It is this divergence that in large measure
affects the indeterminacy of judicial opinions in administrative law. We
should not ignore this reality. Nor should we glory in it.
B. Scant Guidance From Prior Case Law
The second reason for indeterminacy comes from the difference in
opinions expressed in the myriad of discrete cases that bubble up from
82. Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform-The Whole Story, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
1995, at A12 (arguing that current congressional regulatory reform efforts may be largely
symbolic and that effective reform will require more substantive changes in the law).
83. Id.
84. Id.; The Next Environmental Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, § 4, at 14.
85. See Hearings on the Regulatory Transaction Act of 1995, H.R. 450 Before the Sub-
comm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Comm.
on Government Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 19, 1995) (opening state-
ment of Congressman David McIntosh stating that "unnecessary regulation has hurt the
American people" and calling for a six month moratorium on new federal regulations).
86. Legislation Branch Appropriations Act, 1996, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 104-53, 109 Stat.
514, 526 (1995).
87. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1996, tit.
IV, Pub. L. No. 104-52, 109 Stat. 468, 480 (1995).
88. Cindy Skrzycki, For Agencies' Foes, Impasse Is Dream with a Double Edge, WASH.
POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at D1 (quoting Donald Devine).
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the regulatory process. In the APA, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out,
Congress expressed a "mood"89 regarding the character of judicial re-
view. But a "mood" or tone does not provide a detailed script to utilize
when reviewing agency decisions. That is why as the "classic standard of
review case"9 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,9 1 makes clear, when it
comes to judicial review of administrative action, "judges are not autom-
ata .... [since] There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process
of judgment."92 It is sound judgment from our judges, not determinacy,
that is all we can expect; indeed, all that can be hoped for.
Shapiro and Levy give the game away when they point out that
"[b]ecause the Supreme Court has not promoted use of the State Farm
criteria, the definition of 'arbitrary and capricious' remains relatively in-
determinate."93 We now can see, if only vaguely, the answer to the inde-
terminacy problem. As the number of judicial decisions interpreting a
particular statutory or regulatory phrase increase, the more likely, over
time, the meaning of the phrase will become settled or, in Shapiro and
Levy's language, "determinate." So the answer to the debate over how to
promote judicial understanding of Congressional intent is more opinions,
not more precise statutes. That is the way of the common law and, like
that "old time religion," it is good enough for me. If only for determi-
nacy's sake.
III. THE ELUSIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Given the difficulty courts face because of indeterminacy, Shapiro and
Levy propose a legislative solution to the scope of review problem. They
wish to amend APA § 706, in effect, codifying the Chevron and State
Farm tests.94 Indeed, they believe that amending § 706 in this manner
89. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (explaining that when
enacting the APA, Congress left unchanged the broad review standards of the Taft-Hartley
Act).
90. CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, TEACHERS
MANUAL 135 (2d ed. 1991).
91. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
92. Id. at 488-89. See generally Alfred S. Neely, Justice Frankfurter, Universal Camera
and A Jurisprudence of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 1
(1994) (reviewing Universal Camera and criticizing Justice Frankfurter's opinion on judicial
review of administrative fact findings).
93. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1067.
94. Id. at 1073-76. Specifically, Shapiro and Levy's proposal is as follows:
§ 706. Scope of Review The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions if the court determines that
(A) the agency decision violates a constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
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would also better integrate the two decisions.95 With their proposal, Sha-
piro and Levy hope to provide greater direction to judges in applying the
tests, by focusing on a series of "specific inquiries." 96
Obviously judicial review statutes will give courts guidance in how ag-
gressive their review should be or what criteria courts should look to in
undertaking that review. Experience shows that the more statutes try to
codify every aspect of the judicial process, the more confusing (and un-
helpful to judges) those statutes often become. In many respects, it is
better to rely on the body of case law to provide guidance to the judiciary
against the background of a statutorily identified "mood" than attempt to
micro-manage the judiciary's evaluation process. For these reasons, I am
skeptical of recent Republican efforts to "fix" the standard of review by
codifying new instructions for the court.97 I have problems with the Sha-
piro and Levy approach of treating "the first two parts of the State Farm
inquiry as Chevron step two." 98 While I prefer their term 'logically co-
herent explanation' to the requirement of 'reasoned decisionmaking,' ar-
ticulated in Version I of S. 324.99 I certainly do not want to encourage a
(B) the agency decision was made without observance of procedure required by
law;
(C) the agency decision violates its statutory mandate or other statutory provi-
sions because:
(1) the issue has been specifically resolved by explicit statutory language;
(2) the issue has been specifically resolved by legislative history manifesting an
unmistakable congressional intent; or
(3) a contrary interpretation of the statute is unequivocally required by the
traditional tools of statutory construction;
(D) the agency has not offered a valid policy explanation for its decision because:
(1) it relied on policy concerns that were precluded by statute; or
(2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; or
(E) the agency has not offered a logically coherent explanation in terms of agency
expertise, credibility determinations, or policy considerations, of
(1) why the evidence in the record supports its decision; or
(2) why the contrary evidence does not preclude the decision.
Id. at 1074.
95. Id. at 1075-76. In fact, the proposal combines the two tests into a single line of
inquiry. Id. at 1076 n.100.
96. See id. at 1074 (setting forth the proposed amendment and maintaining that the
application of specific inquiries is more appropriate than the use of "open-ended scope of
review standards"); see also supra note 94 (providing Shapiro and Levy's proposed "spe-
cific inquiries").
97. The Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, in particular, attempts to
codify the reviewing court's scope of review. Version 1, supra note 24. It purports to
codify Chevron, or in some instances Chevron-plus. Id. § 624.
98. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1076 n.100.
99. See supra note 28.
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new strain of the so-called "hard look" doctrine for the sake of doctrinal
simplicity.
I should make it clear that I have similar problems with the INS v.
Cardoza-Fondesca'0° cut on Chevron, which basically suggests that when
facing an issue of the clarity of a statute or regulation, a court should
"turn it and turn it again" before giving up on a Chevron step one analy-
sis and finding the statute or regulation unclear. But, like it or not, that is
what the Chevron debate is really all about-how hard the court should
try to find clarity before deferring to the agency decision. It is unrealistic
to expect determinacy on this point (as Justice Scalia continually la-
ments)'' as it is fact-bound and language-of-the-statute/regulation
bound. Indeed, the more you adopt the Cardoza-Fondesca cut on Chev-
ron, the more you are likely to accept Justice Holmes position that "every
question of construction is unique, and an argument that would prevail in
one case may be inadequate in another.' 1 2 There is not much hope for
determinacy here.
Indeed, it is no surprise that the business community, in general, sup-
ported the de novo judicial review required by the Bumpers Amend-
ment,'10 3 and proposed adding requirements of "maximiz[ing] net benefits
to society"'" to the "reasoned decisionmaking"' 0 5 that courts are asked
100. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
101. See id. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia's plaint in Cardoza-Fondesca calls Justice Stevens' opinion "not an inter-
pretation but an evisceration of Chevron" which would make "deference a doctrine of
desperation." Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a letter to Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia
writes "your discussion of Chevron deprives that case of all utility." Bernard Schwartz,
"Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
46 (1995) (quoting letter from Antonin Scalia to John Paul Stevens). Justice Scalia contin-
ued this lamentation in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987), where he sardonically criticized "[s]ome courts"
for following the "dicta" of Cardoza-Fondesca. Cardoza-Fondesca, 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
102. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916) (discussing the fact-driven
nature of judicial review of statutory construction).
103. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1981) (amending § 706). As described by Sena-
tor Grassley, the Bumpers Amendment amended the APA in the following manner:
Reviewing courts are instructed to make independent determinations on all ques-
tions of law whether they be jurisdictional, constitutional, or procedural. No pre-
sumption of validity will attach to agency regulations. The court will be the final
arbiter as to whether an agency has gone beyond congressional intent in taken
certain actions, and will be able to consider an agency's interpretation based on
its persuasiveness, not upon the agency presumed "all knowing" posture which
has often been present in past judicial decisions regarding rulemaking.
128 CONG. REC. S 4730 (daily ed. March 18, 1982) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
104. See Version 1, supra note 24, § 628(c)(1)(C).
105. Id.
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to undertake in reviewing agency rulemakings. The aggressive 'hard
look' approach often reflected by the term 'reasoned decisionmaking'
easily transmutes into an excuse for legal activism. As recently stated by
Professor Pierce:
There is powerful circumstantial evidence that judges often ap-
ply the duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking the same
way most people make and explain decisions. They first make a
decision and then explain that decision on grounds that may
have little relation to the actual basis for the decision. Thus, a
judge often decides whether to uphold or to reject a rule based
on his view concerning the desirability of the rule and then ex-
plains that decision with reference to the agency's compliance
with the malleable duty to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking.10 6
There is much truth, then, in Nicholas Zeppo's insight that "[g]roups-
including those that sometimes prevail in the legislative arena-prefer a
more aggressive standard of judicial review even though this might lead
to the invalidation of [to them] beneficial federal laws." 107
IV. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE JUDICIARY
Shapiro and Levy's efforts rest on an acceptance of public choice the-
ory as explaining the behavior of judges. In Shapiro and Levy's view,
judicial behavior can be explained by the judges desire to maximize util-
ity, in the form of leisure, ideology, or respect. And they maximize utility
by adherence to either a craft- or outcome-oriented decision-making pro-
cess. They argue that this quest for utility maximization is subject to ten-
sion between a desire to adhere to recognized doctrine and a competing
desire to achieve particular outcomes consistent with the individual
judge's values.
I must confess to feeling extremely uncomfortable with the application
of public choice theory to federal judges in the manner undertaken by
Shapiro and Levy. I certainly appreciate that the judiciary is likely to
seek higher pay and even more expansive perks. Moreover, judges are as
capable (unfortunately) of blind professional interest and even mauvais
foi as the next man or woman. But I really do think that the Shapiro/
Levy notion that "judges seek to reduce their work and expand their lei-
sure time" is absurd and their insight that "judges will pursue leisure only
106. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN.
L. REV. 59, 71 (1995) (citations omitted) (stating that judges may be tempted to engage in
judicial activism based on political beliefs).
107. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope
of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 296, 298 (1993).
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when the utility they gain from it outweighs the respect-based and ideo-
logical utility they may gain through work" is vacuous. 10 8 Or more po-
litely, that "public choice analysis, as applied to judicial behavior,
necessarily yields a very meager harvest." 109 Such sentiments are truisms
that have little relevance to the federal judges I know (admittedly a self-
selected cohort!).
In large measure the application of public choice theory to federal
judges fails because "[a] judge's role is sharply demarcated by custom,
common law, intellectual traditions, and specific rules for interpretation
that seem to permit only minimal room for self-interest and ideology.""
l0
I have no doubt that trips to Europe, academic honors, and bar associa-
tion approval are items to which judges respond favorably. In their non-
judging roles, judges are as self-interested as the rest of us. But this is a
far cry from the notion developed by Posner and Landes that judicial
behavior is itself "rent-seeking." Indeed, even if it is the case that judges
"enforce the 'deals' made by effective [that is to say rent-seeking] interest
groups with earlier legislatures,""'1 such behavior only serves as evidence
that judges will interpret statutes passed by legislatures whether the legis-
lative enactments reflect either special interests or the "public" interest
(however defined). It is the decision-making process of judges, not the
"rent-seeking" of legislators that concerns us here.
The ideological utility point does have some relevance to judges. But
this is far different than the outcome determinative notion. It is, I think,
the legal reflection of their common political perspective that leads a
group of 'Federalist Society' judges to cohere around a particular out-
come which they determine to be legally appropriate (or a group of
'Great Society' judges for that matter). Judge Wald has pointed out that,
to a large extent, judges appointed by Presidents of different political par-
ties can still stake out broad agreement on matters of law. 112 In fact,
108. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1056.
109. Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of
Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 827, 827 (arguing that public choice theory
analysis is not effective in defining judicial behavior).
110. William C. Mitchell & Randy T. Simmons, Public Choice and the Judiciary: Intro-
ductory Notes, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 729, 741 (explaining why, unlike elected politicians,
judges face much more traditional and professional constraints on decision-making that are
not addressed by public choice principles).
111. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 894 (1975).
112. Patricia M. Wald, ..... Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief', 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1127, 1142-43 (1992) (viewing judges as independent decisionmakers who are not influ-
enced by most political pressures). In the 1991-1992 time frame Judge Wald found dissents
in only 10% of the docket. Id.; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the
Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 856. Judge Edwards
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empirical analysis of voting patterns have borne out Judge Wald's
assertions. 113
Furthermore, data gathered by Judge Harry Edwards reports similar
findings in the D.C. Circuit. He notes that even on "mixed" panels, or
those "consisting of one 'liberal' and two 'conservative' judges or vice
versa," dissents were filed in less than ten percent of all cases decided by
full opinion. 114 This result eclipsed even the dissent rate for all panels,
which recorded dissents in thirteen percent of the cases decided by full
opinion." 5 While Judge Edwards adheres to his belief in "principled
decisionmaking," later work finds him questioning whether "partisan
politics and ideological maneuvering have no meaningful influence on ju-
dicial decisionmaking." 1 6
Continued media focus on the political aspects of the judiciary seem to
have occasioned this shift. Judge Edwards complains that the cases dis-
cussed by the media evidencing an ideological split on the court, account
for a small minority of the docket, and that these misperceptions, if con-
tinued, may become self-fulfilling as judges react to the widespread no-
tion of their work as a political function.1" 7 While citing to the war on
drugs as "[a] [s]truggle [a]gainst [u]nprincipled [d]ecisionmaking," and
addressing the history of previous ill-advised judicial compromises in
notes that, in the D.C. Circuit in 1990, dissents were filed in only 2.6% of the cases decided.
Id. Even on "mixed panels," containing judges appointed by Presidents of different par-
ties, the dissent rate did not exceed the general rate. Id.
Judge Edwards maintains that the judiciary strives to avoid ideological or partisan pref-
erences, but surprisingly notes that "[tioday, more than eleven years after becoming a
judge, I am less sanguine in my views." Id. at 838. He explains this change in view as
resulting from "external pressures felt by judges ... created ... by the continuing distor-
tion of public perceptions ...." Id.
113. See William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Im-
pact of Appointments to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 669,
696-99 (1991) (noting that the overall rate of disagreement is not significant in environ-
mental cases, and that judges of different ideologies cast similar votes in 87% of the cases
on which they sit on the same panel). Interestingly, the author notes a greater degree of
discord on Judge Wald's court, the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 704-05; see also William E. Kovacic,
Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 72-77
(1991) (reaching similar results in the antitrust area). Again, it is noted that when sitting
on the same panel, judges of differing political leanings agreed 87% of the time. Id. at 73.
114. See Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 629-30 (1985).
Judge Edwards cited statistics addressing decisions between July 1, 1983 and June 30, 1984.
Id. at 629. Comparing these numbers to those for the 1990-91 term, the results seem con-
sistent, with the dissent rate for cases decided by full opinion still roughly ten percent.
Compare id. with Edwards, supra note 101, at 856.
115. Edwards, supra note 114, at 630.
116. Edwards, supra note 112, at 838.
117. Id. at 853 (lamenting that many believe judicial decisionmaking is determined by
politics and not by the merits of each case).
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times of national emergency, Judge Edwards still contends that, for the
most part, federal judges struggle to reach principled decisions."18
Other commentary argues that a judge's background and experiences
must play a part in the deliberative process." 9 It is asserted that even "a
decision that involves the application of a rule is not-and logically can-
not be-constrained by the rule in question.' 20 Professor Wells adopts a
more moderate approach in describing the judicial process, which in-
volves the intertwining of both rules of law and the individual experience
of the judge. This approach makes no mention of the utility sought by the
deciding judge, rather it explains how individual factors can influence
decisions. 12 1
Still, one's gut feeling is that a conservative position will fare better
with judges like Ray Randolph or Steve Williams than Harry Edwards or
Pat Wald. The Eskridge/Frickey study of the 1993 term provides 'some
evidence' for the view that Reagan-era justices will reward Reagan-era
appointees who are 'tough' on Clinton administration policies.122 So
does Professor Pierce. 23 Other commentators, even those outside the
legal profession, also seem convinced that an ideological rift exists in the
D.C. Circuit.'24 Still, if I had to choose between a fellow Reaganaut on
the bench and a good legal argument, I would choose the latter.
118. Id. at 839-49 (using the internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II, the
Cold War suppression of First Amendment rights, and the current war on drugs as exam-
ples of problematic result-oriented decisionmaking). Judge Edwards describes the current
call for result-oriented decisions as a challenge to the judiciary, and expresses confidence
that the goal of principled decisionmaking will be realized. Id. at 840-41.
119. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflec-
tions on the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323, 330-31 (1992).
120. Id. at 331.
121. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Process of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 263 (1992). The Chief Justice describes judging as a compromise, where individual
beliefs are just one part of the process. See id. at 270. He stresses the importance of
building a majority opinion, and notes that "some give and take is inevitable, and doctrinal
purity may be muddied in the process." Id.
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26, 75-76 (1994) (discussing the opinion by some commentators that the
United States Supreme Court may affirm or reverse lower court decisions based on polit-
ical decisions).
123. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 300, 303-07 (opining that personal ideology and politics are a significant factor in the
D.C. Circuit's review of agency decisions).
124. See The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L.
REv. 507, 541-42 (1988) (remarks of Professor Rabkin, who characterizes the court as a
partisan split between those favoring the interests of special interest groups and those
favoring strong executive branch power). Judge Wald refutes these remarks, adhering to
her belief that no such schism exists. Id. at 547.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Shapiro/Levy article raises important questions in administrative
law. I fear, however, that many of their questions will remain unan-
swered, in part because determinacy (in the sense of outcome predictive
results) is not the end goal of the judicial process. One need not accept
Judge Leventhal's proposition that judges should engage the administra-
tive agencies in partnership,125 to recognize that judges are not outcome
predictive automata. It is after all, the art, not the science, of judging that
our courts are all about.
125. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(discussing a belief that the public interest is best served when courts and agencies work
together to effectuate reasoned decision-making), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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